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Abstract
We analyze the implications of consumer privacy for competition in the marketplace. We
consider a market where ￿rms set prices and disclosure levels for consumer information and
consumers observe both before deciding which ￿rm to patronize and how much information
to provide it with. The provision and disclosure of information presents tradeo￿s for all mar-
ket participants. Consumers bene￿t from providing information to the ￿rm, as this increases
the utility they derive from the service, but they incur disutility from information disclosure.
This, in turn, bene￿ts the ￿rm providing an additional source of revenue, but reduces con-
sumer demand for the service. We characterize equilibrium information provision, disclosure
levels, and prices, and show that competition with privacy has several e￿ects on the market-
place. First, competition drives the provision of services with a low level of disclosure. Second,
competition ensures that services with a high level of disclosure subsidize consumers. Third,
￿rms maximize pro￿ts at the extensive rather than the intensive margin, outperforming com-
petitors by attracting a larger customer base. And fourth, higher competition intensity need
not improve consumer privacy when consumers exhibit low willingness to pay. Our ￿ndings
are particularly relevant to the business models of Internet ￿rms and contribute to inform the
regulatory debate on consumer privacy.
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11 Introduction
Digitalization has dramatically lowered the costs of storing and processing large stocks of consumer
information, enabling new forms of advertisement targeting, personalization tools, and price dis-
crimination schemes. Personal consumer information has therefore become a valuable asset in the
marketplace and an important element of ￿rm strategy. Nowhere is this trend more visible than in
online services, where ￿rms are aggressively capturing large stocks of consumer information. Usage
of these information-intensive services by consumers implies provision of personal information, and
￿rms exploit such information to generate new sources of revenue. These tradeo￿s are de￿ning
business models and the role of privacy in online marketplaces.
Prominent examples of these trends can be identi￿ed among major Internet players. Google
provides consumers with services to search the web, manage their email correspondence (gMail),
contacts (Google+), calendar events (Google Calendar), and documents (Google Docs). Consumers
provide personal information to use these services, informing Google about their location, interests,
and social connections when performing searches, communicating with others, and managing their
documents, and derive a direct bene￿t from the services in doing so. Google in turn derives revenues
from disclosing this information by pro￿ling consumers and charging advertisers to target them. A
larger stock of consumer information increases the e￿ectiveness of the targeting and allows Google
to derive higher disclosure revenues, although advertising reduces the bene￿ts consumers derive
from the services. Google’s business model is readily understood by consumers: free services in
exchange for ads.1
Other major Internet players such as Microsoft and Amazon compete with di￿erent approaches.
Microsoft has recently introduced O￿ce 365, an online service which competes with Google’s by
allowing consumers to edit documents, manage email, contacts, and calendar events. In contrast
with Google, however, Microsoft charges consumers for the service and does not disclose their
information for advertising purposes. Microsoft’s recent Scroogled! campaign emphasized the
di￿erence in the following terms: ￿Google goes through every gMail that’s sent or received, looking
for keywords so they can target gMail users with paid ads. And there’s no way to opt out of this
invasion of your privacy. Outlook.com is di￿erent ￿ we don’t go through your email to sell ads.￿
Amazon plays an important role in online search by indexing a large number of products and
allowing third-party sellers to supply them through its websites, competing with Google as a search
gateway in the retail arena. Amazon also exploits consumer information to pro￿le users based
on their search interests and past purchases, and derives revenues by disclosing this information
to sellers. Furthermore, through its Special O￿ers program, Amazon has started to subsidize
1We use the term disclosure to refer to the exploitation of consumer information for revenue-generating purposes,
even though some forms of exploitation may not imply information sharing with third-parties. For example, spot
markets for online advertising may not allow advertisers to observe the identity of target consumers. Nonetheless,
we expect the outcome to approximate that of information sharing because the ￿rm exploiting the information will
account for the objective function of advertisers in order to maximize revenues.
2consumers willing to accept advertising on their mobile devices. Consumers currently bene￿t from
$15 and $20 discounts when purchasing Kindle tablets and e-readers, respectively, if willing to
accept targeted advertisements from Amazon and third-party sellers displayed on the device. This
subsidy renders the basic Kindle e-reader one of the cheapest devices of its kind.
These examples illustrate the choices consumers face when providing their personal information
to online services and the revenue streams ￿rms can tap into by disclosing it. The question is now,
how does this a￿ect competition? Should ￿rms exploit all available revenue sources, prices and
disclosure, or focus on one? If so, which is more pro￿table and what does it depend on? In this
paper we present a model to analyze the strategic interactions generated by consumer information
provision and ￿rm disclosure and how they a￿ect competition in the marketplace. To the best of
our knowledge, we contribute the ￿rst analysis that explains how the provision and disclosure of
consumer information shapes the competitive interaction of ￿rms.
We build on a standard vertical di￿erentiation framework to capture the informational dimen-
sion of the problem, and do so by adopting a reduced-form speci￿cation for service quality which
captures the tradeo￿s outlined above. Firms provide a homogeneous service to consumers and
compete on prices and information disclosure. On the demand side, consumers are the gatekeepers
of their personal information, and they observe the level of disclosure ￿rms engage in as well as
their price before deciding which service to patronize (if any) and how much personal information
to provide it with. The perceived quality of the ￿rm’s service for each consumer increases with
information provision and decreases with the ￿rm’s level of disclosure. On the supply side, there
are two revenue sources available to ￿rms: sales revenues originating from the prices charged to
consumers, and disclosure revenues which depend on their level of disclosure and stock of consumer
information. Firms may choose to exploit both, to forego sales revenues by subsidizing consumers,
or to forego disclosure revenues by not engaging in disclosure.
Our analysis provides insight on how ￿rms compete for consumer information. We show that
￿rms can exploit consumer heterogeneity by di￿erentiating in their levels of information disclosure,
and can pro￿t from doing so even though this sacri￿ces disclosure revenues. Di￿erentiation is
re￿ected on both the level of disclosure ￿rms engage in as well as on the revenue source they choose
to exploit. A ￿rm engaging in a high level of disclosure (low-quality service) chooses to subsidize
consumers, and a ￿rm engaging in a low level of disclosure (high-quality service) charges positive
prices. Such an outcome is a direct consequence of competition, as we show that a monopolist
never chooses to subsidize consumers. Moreover, the presence of disclosure revenues can drive the
high-disclosure (low-quality) ￿rm to derive higher pro￿ts in the marketplace, contrary to what
would be predicted by a standard vertical di￿erentiation framework.
Our analysis also provides insight on the e￿ect of competition on consumer privacy by ex-
plaining the aggregate stock of consumer information disclosed by ￿rms. We ￿nd that the stock
of consumer information disclosed in the marketplace is generally lower under competition than
under monopoly. Thus consumers derive higher surplus and bene￿t from competition, as should
3be expected. But perhaps counterintuitively, higher intensity of competition between ￿rms (which
can be captured in our analysis by the heterogeneity of the consumer population) can result in
an increase the stock of information disclosed, reducing consumer privacy. Consumers still bene￿t
from competition, but do so through prices (or subsidies) rather than through reductions in the
disclosure of their information. Moreover, we also ￿nd that the high-disclosure ￿rm can contribute
the most to consumer surplus. From a policy perspective, this implies that high levels of disclo-
sure can be expected in a competitive marketplace and need not reduce consumer welfare when
compensated by subsidization.
The model we use to derive our results is internally complex but tractable, and provides for
clean qualitative predictions in equilibrium. We fully endogenize all the information decisions of
market participants, and the only exogenous parameters in our analysis are those that de￿ne the
distribution of consumer valuations for the service. To obtain the results, several simpli￿cations are
needed. We do not model the interactions arising in the secondary market for consumer information
disclosure. Instead, we assume ￿rms operate as price-takers, for example by participating in a
competitive advertising market. We restrict our analysis to covered market equilibria where all
consumers choose to sign up for one of the services, and consider only the case where consumer
valuations are uniformly distributed and marginal costs are zero. Our analysis is best suited to
online services operating with large user bases and negligible marginal costs.
Our model provides a benchmark for consumer privacy in the context of informed and rational
consumers. We assume consumers are aware of the disclosure practices of ￿rms and internalize
their impact in their decisions and usage of services. Consumers have access to a growing set of
resources to learn about these practices, and privacy regulations increasingly require ￿rms to inform
prospective customers about their disclosure activities. 2 Although we recognize that factors such
as bounded rationality or cognitive biases can distort consumer decisions regarding the provision
of their personal information, we expect consumers to become increasingly familiar with privacy
tradeo￿s in the marketplace. Such consumers can be interpreted as privacy pragmatists according
to survey classi￿cations of privacy attitudes: they are concerned about privacy but are willing to
trade it o￿ if an evaluation of the bene￿ts and risks pays o￿. A growing majority of US consumers
have been reported to pertain to this category. 3
In the next section, we position our paper in the context of the recent managerial and economics
literature relating to online privacy. Section 2 introduces the building blocks of our model and
2News outlets, consumer advocacy groups, and industry initiatives provide consumers with avenues to learn
about the privacy practices of online services. For example, The Wall Street Journal has recently published in-
depth reports about online privacy explaining common disclosure schemes, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
tracks and reports industry developments and best-practices, and Privacy Score provides consumers with updated
scoreboards for popular online services. Privacy regulations are also playing a role in fostering consumer awareness.
For instance, EU Directive 2009/136/EC requires websites that employ activity tracking tools such as cookies to
explicitly disclose their existence to consumers in a comprehensive and user-friendly manner.
3See Alan Westin’s report ‘How online users feel about behavioral marketing and how adoption of privacy and
security policies could a￿ect their feelings,’ Privacy Consulting Group, March 2008.
4the timing of the game. We characterize the monopoly solution in Section 3. This serves as a
benchmark to evaluate the implications of competition. We proceed to solve the case of duopoly
in Section 4, explain the drivers of di￿erentiation and provide a qualitative comparison of the
duopoly and monopoly outcomes. In Section 5 we discuss the managerial and policy implications
of our results by examining ￿rm performance and consumer privacy in equilibrium, and also review
the main empirical implications of our model. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Literature
Privacy is a multidisciplinary concept which has been studied across several ￿elds including eco-
nomics, law, sociology, and political science. Our work relates to the economic dimension of pri-
vacy, understood as the control over access to information by economic agents and its associated
tradeo￿s. Posner (1981) and Stigler (1980) famously argued that privacy can lead to allocation
ine￿ciencies, and is therefore undesirable in the absence of externalities or explicit preferences
for privacy. This view has been challenged more recently. Hermalin and Katz (2006) analyze the
implications of di￿erent privacy regimes and their impact on allocative e￿ciency in the absence of
such externalities and preferences, and ￿nd that privacy can be socially desirable in some cases.
Calzolari and Pavan (2006) evaluate information disclosure between two principals sequentially
contracting with a common agent who strategically decides whether to report her true type, and
show that the e￿ect of privacy on welfare is ambiguous. Hui and Png (2006) provide a survey
on the economics of privacy and argue that externalities generally play an important role in the
collection and exploitation of consumer information.
Our approach is motivated by the most prevalent forms of exploitation of consumer informa-
tion in online services, such as advertising. These forms of exploitation have a negative impact on
consumers in the form of attention costs or search bias (or do so beyond some overload threshold).
In addition, consumers generally exhibit an explicit preference for privacy over their communica-
tion channels. Noam (1995a, 1995b) provides a prescient account of the privacy implications of
advances in electronic telecommunications, and argues that a competitive marketplace can con-
tribute solutions to consumer demands for privacy. Spulber (2009) reviews the evolving market
structure of online search and advertising services, and argues that competition in this market can
discipline the disclosure policies of search ￿rms and increase the share of the surplus appropriated
by consumers. Our work formalizes these arguments and explains the precise impact of competi-
tion in this market. We show that gains in consumer surplus associated with higher intensity of
competition need not result in privacy improvements when information disclosure is pro￿table for
￿rms.
Our model relates to the growing literature on two-sided markets pioneered by Rochet and
Tirole (2003) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003), as well as later contributions such as Armstrong
(2006). Firms in our model can be interpreted to intermediate a two-sided market where con-
5sumers provide personal information on one side and advertisers purchase the information which
is disclosed on the other side. Most applications in the literature consider settings where each side
of the market bene￿ts from participation on the other side, implying that positive externalities
are present between both sides. In our setting, similarly to Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010),
consumers bene￿t from the services provided by the intermediary ￿rms but derive disutility from
disclosure, implying that the disclosure side generates negative externalities on the consumer side.
Thus our model also addresses the question of when it is optimal for ￿rms to adopt a one-sided
business model and exclude the side that generates negative externalities.
Our model does not explicitly address the rationale for intermediation in the marketplace,
though we note that such intermediation is consistent with the presence of negative externalities.
Sandholm (2005) provides a general framework to show that pricing schemes can improve e￿ciency
in the presence of negative externalities. For the case of advertising, intermediation can improve
targeting precision and reduce the attention costs imposed on consumers, thereby increasing al-
locative e￿ciency as analyzed by Van Zandt (2004). Our model provides a rich characterization
of the consumer side of the market but in turn simpli￿es the disclosure side, where prices are
assumed to be ￿xed and exogenous and therefore una￿ected by the actions of ￿rms. The pricing
of consumer information is a complex problem and is beyond the scope of our analysis. Baccara
(2007) presents a general equilibrium model that explains the price of information in the R&D
context, where contractors may disclose the information of their customers, and ￿nds that higher
concentration in the market for information (fewer contractors with higher market power) raises
the price of information. In our model, such an e￿ect would reduce the disclosure revenues ￿rms
derive when simultaneously engaging in disclosure, reinforcing the incentives for di￿erentiation. 4
A recent strand of the theoretical literature has examined the implications of consumer privacy
with regard to anonymity and price discrimination. If ￿rms can identify returning consumers,
they may infer their willingness to pay and set prices accordingly. Villas-Boas (2004) considers the
case of a monopolist facing both new and returning consumers, and shows that optimal pricing
can exhibit price cycles over time. Taylor (2004) considers the case of two sequential sellers and
examines how information disclosure between sellers a￿ects their pricing strategies. Acquisti and
Varian (2005) examine the case where sophisticated consumers can use anonymizing tools and
￿rms can o￿er improved service to those that choose to remain identi￿able. Conitzer, Taylor and
Wagman (2012) analyze the impact of the cost of anonymity for consumers facing a monopolist,
and show that increasing the cost of anonymity can bene￿t consumers.
Our focus di￿ers from the above contributions in that we consider the e￿ect of consumer
4The price commanded by the personal information of consumers will also depend on its broader availability. Note
that consumers single-home in our model, so ￿rms become gatekeepers of the information they accumulate through
their services. Reports from the data brokerage industry suggest that consumer information in abundant supply
such as names, addresses, and emails, as well as demographics including age, race, and occupation, command a low
price in the marketplace. Information on sensitive topics such as health related interests and gambling propensity,
or time-sensitive events such as marriage, pregnancy, or divorce, are in limited supply and command higher prices.
See for instance ‘Everything we know about what data brokers know about you’, ProPublica, March 7 2013.
6information provision on the quality of services rather than on prices. Our approach relates to
that of Ak￿ura and Srinivasan (2005), who ￿rst examined the tradeo￿ faced by the monopolist
deriving both sales revenues and disclosure revenues. They analyze the case where the monopolist
decides the supply of information required of consumers in order for them to participate in the
service. Our approach di￿ers in that we examine the case where consumers unilaterally decide how
much information to provide and we also analyze competition. Because consumers derive positive
utility from information provision in our model, our approach is better suited to applications
where consumers directly bene￿t from providing information (e.g., search engines, cloud storage)
and Ak￿ura and Srinivasan’s model is better suited to applications where consumer information
mainly bene￿ts the ￿rm (e.g., airline bookings, retail banking). We further relate our ￿ndings to
those of Ak￿ura and Srinivasan in our monopoly analysis in Section 3.
In recent years, several papers have examined consumer attitudes toward online privacy. Chel-
lappa and Sin (2005) present a survey to evaluate the tradeo￿ consumers face when providing
personal information to online services. They measure consumer valuations for the personalization
bene￿ts as well as consumer concerns regarding alternative uses of their information by the ￿rm.
They ￿nd that consumers’ positive valuation for personalization exceeds their negative concern
for privacy. Tsai et al. (2011) report an online shopping experiment based on a search engine
where results are annotated with privacy ratings based on sellers’ privacy policies. They ￿nd that
subjects are willing to pay a premium for privacy when such information is salient. Tucker (2011)
analyzes the e￿ectiveness of a personalized advertising campaign in a social network, and ￿nds that
it is positively a￿ected by consumers’ perceived control over the use of their personal information.
The ￿ndings reported in these papers suggest that consumers account for privacy considerations
when deciding which ￿rms to patronize and how much personal information to provide.
Other empirical contributions have considered the supply side of the market. Preibusch and
Bonneau (2013) analyze the degree of di￿erentiation in the data collection policies of major Internet
sites according to tra￿c rank in several service categories. They ￿nd a signi￿cant degree of
di￿erentiation in search engines and social networking, categories that meet the characteristics
of those considered here. They also ￿nd that services operating under less competition tend to
request consumers to supply more personal information. Goldfarb and Tucker (2010) evaluate
the impact of privacy regulations in Europe on the e￿ectiveness of online advertising. These
regulations restrict the information that can be collected and processed from consumers for the
purpose of targeted advertising, in e￿ect restricting information disclosure by ￿rms. They ￿nd that
such restrictions signi￿cantly reduce advertising e￿ectiveness, and should therefore be expected to
reduce the disclosure revenues of ￿rms.
72 The model
Consider a market with two ￿rms and a unit mass of consumers. Firms supply a homogeneous
service and compete on two separate dimensions: price and privacy. Each ￿rm sets a price pj
and a level of consumer information disclosure dj for its service. Consumers are heterogeneous in
their valuation of the service, which is uniformly distributed across the consumer population. The
valuation of consumer i is given by vi  U[V  ;V +]. For tractability, we restrict our analysis to
equilibria where the market is covered. A necessary condition that guarantees full market coverage
is 0 < V   < V + < 2.
Consumers participating in the market and signing up to the service of one of the ￿rms decide
how much personal information to provide, and we denote the information provision of consumer
i to ￿rm j by yi;j.5 The utility derived by consumer i from ￿rm j, given price pj and disclosure
level dj, is given by
ui;j = vi yi;j(1   yi;j   dj)   pj; (1)
where the expression yi;j(1   yi;j   dj) captures the informational quality of ￿rm j’s service for
consumer i. The speci￿cation implies that informational quality is concave in yi;j and decreasing
in dj, so consumers stand to bene￿t from providing information yi;j to the ￿rm but incur disutility
from ￿rm disclosure dj.6 The marginal bene￿t of information provision is decreasing: the infor-
mation provided by each consumer is decreasing in its relevance to the service. Both yi;j and dj
are endogenous and will be jointly determined in equilibrium. Consumers need to provide some
information to derive positive utility from the service and ￿rms may choose to engage or not in
disclosure, yi;j  0 and dj  0. Also note that the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (1) identi￿es
the consumer’s willingness to pay for the service. Consumers may sign up for the service of one
of the ￿rms or remain out of the market, and so we normalize the outside utility of consumers to
zero.
Firm pro￿ts originate from two revenue sources, the prices directly charged to consumers and
disclosure revenues originating from the exploitation of consumer information. We simplify the
latter by adopting a reduced form for disclosure revenues. The pro￿ts of ￿rm j when serving
consumers vi 2 [v
 
j ;v
+
j ] are given by
j =
1
V +   V  
 v+
j
v 
j
pj + dj yi;j dvi:
Our speci￿cation implies that disclosure prices are exogenous and are normalized to 1. Note
5When usage of the service implies information provision, yi;j can also be interpreted as usage intensity.
6We assume for simplicity that consumers always derive disutility from disclosure. If consumers exhibit an
acceptance threshold for disclosure, for example if a certain degree of advertising is acceptable, then disclosure in
our model can be interpreted as the level of excess advertising that ￿rms engage in.
8however that the relative weight of disclosure revenues with respect to the price revenues charged
to consumers will depend on consumers’ willingness to pay, which in turn depends on the ￿rm’s level
of disclosure and consumer valuations for the service. The boundaries on V   and V + ensure that
the analysis encompasses cases where feasible disclosure revenues are higher than price revenues
and cases where they are lower. We also let ￿rms set negative prices if they choose to subsidize
consumers. We assume that ￿rms face zero marginal costs to simplify the analysis, and without
loss of generality, assume ￿xed costs are zero.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms simultaneously set their disclosure
level dj. In the second stage, ￿rms simultaneously set prices pj. In the third stage, having observed
disclosures and prices, consumers choose to sign up for the service o￿ered by one of the ￿rms or
to stay out of the market. In the fourth stage, consumers patronizing a ￿rm decide how much
information yi;j to provide it with.
Firms are committed to the level of disclosure they announce in the ￿rst stage and cannot
increase it after obtaining consumers’ personal information. This modeling assumption re￿ects
the fact that reputational concerns and privacy regulations make it costly for ￿rms to backtrack
on their disclosure commitments or to deceive consumers. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act requires US ￿nancial institutions to provide consumers with a notice and opt-out opportunity
before they disclose their information to una￿liated third-parties, making it costly for ￿rms to
increase information disclosure ex-post. Another example is that of US retailer Toysmart.com,
which after ￿ling for bankruptcy was blocked by the FTC from selling customer information. The
sale was considered deceitful to consumers because the company’s privacy policy stated that ￿when
you register with Toysmart.com, you can rest assured that your information will never be shared
with a third-party.￿ 7
3 Monopoly benchmark
We start our analysis by considering the monopoly case, which serves as a benchmark to evaluate
the impact of competition in the next section. We proceed to solve the monopolist’s optimization
program by backwards induction.
Information provision. Consider the problem of consumer i in the fourth stage when deciding
how much information to provide ￿rm j with when using its service. The consumer maximizes ui;j
in (1) by choosing yi;j given the ￿rm’s disclosure level dj and price pj, which implies
yi;j =
1   dj
2
= yj: (2)
Optimal information provision is homogeneous across consumers, yi;j = yi0;j for all i and i0, so that
7See ‘FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for Deceptively O￿ering for Sale Personal Information of Website
Visitors,’ FTC press release, July 2000.
9the ￿rm obtains the same amount of information from each of its users.
Purchasing decisions. We next consider the problem of consumer i in the third stage when
deciding to sign up for ￿rm j’s service or stay out of the market. The consumer evaluates the utility
derived from the service given by ui;j in (1), anticipating optimal information provision given by
(2), and signs up only if ui;j  0. We proceed by identifying the valuation of the indi￿erent
consumer vf who is strictly indi￿erent between signing up or not. Solving for uf;j = 0 yields
vf =
4pj
(1   dj)2: (3)
Note that @ui;j=@vi > 0 given optimal information provision in (2), so consumers with a higher
valuation than the indi￿erent consumer vi > vf will prefer to sign up and those with lower valuation
vi < vf will prefer to stay out. Therefore, when vf > V  , some consumers do not sign up and the
market is uncovered, and when vf  V  , all consumers sign up and the market is covered. Because
the monopolist’s demand di￿ers in the covered and uncovered market con￿gurations, both cases
need to be considered separately in what follows.
Monopoly pricing. We next analyze the pricing problem of the monopolist in the second stage
given disclosure level dm. Consider ￿rst the case of an uncovered market. Given that consumer
information provision in (2) is homogeneous across all consumers signing up for the service, we
can write the monopolist’s pro￿ts as

u
m(pm;dm) =
V +   vf
V +   V  (pm + dm ym); (4)
and solving for the optimal price in an uncovered market, denoted by pu
m, obtains
p
u
m =
(1   dm)(V +(1   dm)   2dm)
8
: (5)
Consider next the case of a covered market. Monopoly pro￿ts are then given by

c
m(pm;dm) = pm + dm ym; (6)
and the monopolist’s optimal price in a covered market, denoted by pc
m, is given by the highest
price that ensures all consumers sign up. In this case, the indi￿erent consumer vf must coincide
with the consumer with the lowest valuation in the population. Equating vf(pc
m;dm) = V   yields
p
c
m =
V  (1   dm)2
4
: (7)
Monopoly disclosure. Consider the ￿rst stage when the monopolist sets disclosure level dm.
Inspection of yj in (2) reveals that the valid disclosure range of the ￿rm is given by dj 2 [0;1], given
that negative disclosure or negative information provision are both unfeasible. In an uncovered
10market con￿guration, plugging optimal price pu
m in (5) into pro￿ts u
m in (4) obtains monopoly
pro￿ts as a function of disclosure u
m(dm). Maximizing u
m(dm) with respect to dm subject to the
constraint dm  0 (feasible disclosure range) and vf(pu
m;dm) > V   (uncovered market) obtains
optimal disclosure in an uncovered market 8
d
u
m = 0 if V   <
2 + V +
2
and V +  2:
No uncovered market solution exists outside this parameter range. Therefore, a necessary condition
for the monopolist to choose not to cover the market is V +  2, which we have ruled out (see
Section 2).
Consider next the case of a covered market. Plugging pc
m in (7) into c
m in (6) obtains pro￿ts
as a function of disclosure c
m(dm). Recall that optimal price pc
m ensures that the market is
e￿ectively covered. Maximizing c
m(dm) with respect to dm subject to the constraint dm  0
(feasible disclosure range) obtains optimal disclosure in a covered market
d
c
m =
8
> <
> :
1   V  
2   V   if V   < 1;
0 if V    1.
The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1. The monopolist chooses to cover the market in equilibrium and customers provide
information ym = (1   dm)=2. When V   < 1; the monopolist sets disclosure level dm = (1  
V  )=(2   V  ) and price pm = V  =4(2   V  )2. When V    1; the monopolist sets dm = 0 and
pm = V  =4.
The monopolist faces an important tradeo￿ in determining the price and the level of information
disclosure o￿ered to consumers. On the one hand, an increase in price reduces demand for the
service, which reduces the user base and the information stock over which the ￿rm can extract
disclosure revenues. On the other hand, an increase in the level of disclosure decreases consumers’
willingness to pay for the service, thus reducing price revenues. In addition, the monopolist faces
an information provision tradeo￿ when setting the level of disclosure. The provision of information
by consumers signing up for service is decreasing in the level of disclosure, and consumers prefer
not to provide information to the ￿rm when it engages in maximum disclosure. As a consequence,
the monopolist considers only intermediate levels of disclosure, striking a balance between the
information stock obtained from consumers and the revenues from disclosing it.
The monopolist always covers the market in equilibrium. If there are consumers with low
valuations for the service (V   < 1), it chooses to engage in information disclosure ( dm > 0).
8Note that u
m(dm) does not depend on dm when V + = 2. In this particular case, the monopolist is indi￿erent
when choosing disclosure level dm, so we proceed by assuming that the monopolist chooses dm = 0 under indi￿erence.
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Figure 1: Monopoly disclosure and price as a function of the consumer population’s valuation
mean (left) and spread (right). The axes origins are located at (0,0) in all plots unless otherwise
noted.
Moreover, because @dm=@V    0, the larger the mass of consumers with low valuations, the
higher the level of disclosure. Intuitively, when average willingness to pay for the service is low,
the monopolist cannot extract much consumer surplus through price revenues. Thus, revenues
from information disclosure are comparatively higher and dm > 0. When willingness to pay for the
service is high, however, price revenues become comparatively more attractive and the monopolist
prefers that monetization mode. In fact, when V    1, the monopolist chooses not to disclose
information dm = 0 so that it can charge the largest possible price for the service.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of changes in the mean and in the spread of the consumer
population’s distribution of valuations. For the reasons just discussed, an increase in the mean
valuation that preserves the spread drives the monopolist to increase price and to reduce disclosure.
An increase in the spread that preserves the mean of the distribution implies that consumers
become more heterogeneous in their valuations, and this reduces the price revenue that the ￿rm
can extract. This drives the monopolist to lower the price in order to ensure that all consumers
participate and to increase the level of information disclosure.
Our monopoly analysis is closely related to that of Ak￿ura and Srinivasan (2005), who ￿rst
analyzed the problem of the monopolist facing a tradeo￿ between sales revenues and disclosure
revenues. In both cases, higher levels of information disclosure in equilibrium command lower
prices for consumers. An important di￿erence, however, is that the monopolist may subsidize
some consumers in their model. This outcome arises in Ak￿ura and Srinivasan’s analysis because
they consider the case where the monopolist can decide the information provision required of each
consumer. In our model, consumers decide unilaterally how much information to provide. In this
context the monopolist never chooses to subsidize consumers, and we show in the next section that
12subsidization will only arise under competition. 9
4 Competing with privacy
We next evaluate the case of duopoly. A straightforward implication of our model is that ￿rms
supplying homogeneous services will bene￿t from di￿erentiated disclosure levels. Inspection of ui;j
in (1) reveals that if two ￿rms set the same disclosure level, they become perfect substitutes for
consumers, so price competition then drives their pro￿ts down to zero. Thus, we let j 2 fl;hg
and assume without loss of generality that dl  dh. Firm l discloses less consumer information
than ￿rm h (when the inequality is strict so that ￿rms are di￿erentiated), and as a consequence
its product is perceived as being of higher quality than that of ￿rm h.
Information provision. To solve for the equilibrium, note that consumer information pro-
vision in the fourth stage as characterized in (2) carries over to the case of duopoly for each
￿rm.
Purchasing decisions. We examine the problem of consumer i in the third stage when
deciding whether to sign up with ￿rm l or with ￿rm h.10 Consider ￿rst the case where the high-
disclosure ￿rm prices above the low-disclosure ￿rm, ph > pl. In this case, all consumers derive
higher utility from ￿rm l, so ￿rm h obtains zero demand and pro￿ts. Below, we show that ￿rm h
can obtain positive pro￿ts by undercutting the price of ￿rm l. Therefore, ph > pl will never arise
in equilibrium.
Consider next the case where the high-disclosure ￿rm sets a price lower than that of the low-
disclosure ￿rm, ph  pl. When ￿rms are di￿erentiated, note that @ui;l=@vi > @ui;h=@vi > 0 given
equilibrium information provision yj in (2), so that high-valuation consumers will sign up with
￿rm l and low-valuation consumers will sign up with ￿rm h. We can identify the valuation of the
pivot consumer vp who is strictly indi￿erent between signing up with ￿rm l and ￿rm h by equating
up;l = up;h,
vp =
4(pl   ph)
(dh   dl)(2   dh   dl)
: (8)
9It can be shown that subsidization also arises in our speci￿cation if information provision ym is chosen by the
monopolist or assumed to be exogenous. Thus the absence of subsidization under monopoly is explained by the fact
that consumers unilaterally decide their information provision. It is also worth noting that Ak￿ura and Srinivasan
(2005) consider a speci￿cation where disclosure revenues depend on consumer valuations. In our model, consumer
valuations for the service and disclosure revenues are independent; higher consumer valuations do not translate into
higher disclosure revenues. However, in some cases, both may be correlated. Wealthier consumers with a higher
willingness to pay are also more valuable targets for advertisers. We note that if consumer valuations were positively
correlated with disclosure revenues in our model, this would reduce the monopolist’s incentives to cover the market,
given that serving low valuation consumers becomes comparatively less pro￿table.
10As noted in Section 2 and proved below, our assumptions on the distribution of consumer valuations imply that
the market is fully covered in equilibrium. We have also analyzed uncovered market con￿gurations under duopoly,
but unfortunately found them to be intractable. Nonetheless, we believe that the covered market con￿guration is
empirically relevant given the high market penetration enjoyed by free or subsidized online services.
13When the market is covered, consumers with vi 2 [V  ;vp) sign up with ￿rm h and consumers
vi 2 [vp;V +] sign up with ￿rm l.
Duopoly pricing. Consider the pricing problem of both ￿rms in the second stage. Pro￿ts in
a covered market con￿guration given disclosure levels dl < dh and prices ph < pl are
l(pl;ph;dl;dh) =
V +   vp
V +   V  (pl + dl yl)
h(pl;ph;dl;dh) =
vp   V  
V +   V  (ph + dh yh):
(9)
Solving the corresponding system of price best-response functions we obtain a unique pair of
equilibrium prices, pl (dl;dh) and ph (dl;dh).
Duopoly disclosures. Plugging equilibrium prices pl (dl;dh) and ph (dl;dh) from the previous
step into ￿rm pro￿ts l and h in (9) we obtain pro￿ts as a function of disclosure levels, l(dl;dh)
and h(dl;dh). Solving the system of disclosure best-response functions we obtain the equilibrium
disclosure levels, dl and dh.
The following proposition presents the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In the duopoly equilibrium, the market is covered and customers patronizing ￿rm
j 2 fl;hg provide information
yj =
1   dj
2
:
Firms quote prices
pl (dl;dh) =
 
d
2
h(2 + V
    2V
+)   2dh(1 + V
    2V
+) + dl
 
dl(4   V
  + 2V
+)   4 + 2V
    4V
+
=12
ph (dl;dh) =
 
d
2
l(2   2V
  + V
+) + dl( 2 + 4V
    2V
+) + dh
 
dh(4 + 2V
    V
+)   4   4V
  + 2V
+
=12:
Consider the three parameter regions shown in Figure 2 below. In Region A, the equilibrium
disclosures of both ￿rms are in the interior:
dl =1 +
2
3
 
1
V +   V    
s
V +   2V   + 2
(2 + V     2V +)(V +   V  )2
!
dh =1  
2
3
 
1
V +   V    
s
2V +   V     2
(2V     2   V +)(V +   V  )2
!
:
In Region B, ￿rm l is at the corner where it chooses not to disclose consumer information:
dl =0
dh =
3
2
 
10   2V   + V +
2
p
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:
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Figure 2: The left panel identi￿es parameter regions where the interior and corner solutions derived
in Proposition 2 constitute an equilibrium. The mathematical derivations can be found in Appendix
A. The right panel identi￿es the parameter trajectories used in the remaining ￿gures of the paper.
The shaded region in the right panel identi￿es the parameter region where uncovered market
deviations pay o￿, as characterized in Appendix B.
Finally, in Region C both ￿rms are at the corner:
dl =0
dh =0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Firms competing with privacy bene￿t from di￿erentiating in their levels of disclosure in order
to cater to distinct consumer segments. The left panel in Figure 2 depicts three regions over the
parameter space (V  ;V +) which are denoted by A, B, and C. The equilibrium expressions for
dl and dh di￿er across the three regions. Region A contains interior equilibria where both ￿rms
engage in disclosure (0 < dl < dh), Region B contains corner equilibria where only one of the ￿rms
engages in disclosure (dl = 0 < dh), and Region C contains corner equilibria where neither ￿rm
engages in disclosure (dl = dh = 0). Region B is further subdivided into two subregions B1 and
B2 where the pro￿t ranking of both duopolists di￿ers. Note that di￿erentiation breaks down in
Region C because engaging in disclosure is not pro￿table for ￿rms when consumer valuations are
high and mostly homogenous. This follows from the fact that ￿rms engaging in disclosure need
to subsidize consumers, but disclosure revenues are ￿xed and independent of consumer valuations.
We further discuss this result and the pro￿t ranking of ￿rms in Section 5.1. In order to understand
the shape of the three regions depicted in Figure 2, recall that we do not consider points above
the 45o line because V   < V +. Also, as we show in Appendix A, there are no equilibria with full
market coverage when parameters V   and V + are to the right of the line with slope 2 that begins
at V + = 1. The interior boundaries V  and V  that separate the three regions originate from the
15disclosure best-responses of both ￿rms. 11
An important property of the duopoly solution is that ￿rms (mostly) focus on a single revenue
source. Firms choosing to engage in disclosure exploit disclosure revenues, and ￿rms choosing
not to engage in disclosure (or performing a low level of disclosure) exploit price revenues instead.
Across most equilibria, ￿rms engaging in disclosure subsidize consumers by quoting negative prices,
and only ￿rms that do not engage in disclosure quote positive prices. Di￿erentiation, therefore,
is re￿ected on both the level of disclosure ￿rms engage in and also (as a consequence) on the
revenue source they exploit. Moreover, disclosure levels are mutually reinforcing because they
exhibit strategic complementarity; if one ￿rm increases its level of disclosure the best-response of
the other ￿rm is to also increase its own level of disclosure (given that equilibrium best-responses
satisfy @ ^ db
l=@dh > 0 and @ ^ dc
h=@dl > 0). In the remaining of this section we review the properties of
duopoly disclosure levels and prices and compare them with those of monopoly. We relegate our
analysis of ￿rm pro￿ts and information stocks to Section 5, where we also discuss the empirical
implications of our results.
In order to review the properties of the duopoly solution, we proceed by separately reviewing the
impact of changes in the spread and the mean of consumers’ distribution of valuations. Consider
the right panel in Figure 2. Note that the further away the parameter pair (V  ;V +) is from the
origin of coordinates, the larger the expected valuation of consumers for the services supplied by
￿rms (valuation mean Ev). Likewise, the closer the parameter pair is to the 45o line, the lower the
heterogeneity in customer preferences (valuation spread v). The dashed lines depict parameter
trajectories where either the valuation mean or the valuation spread are constant. The upper-
slopped trajectory depicts pairs (V  ;V +) such that v is constant but where Ev increases (as
V + grows). The downward-slopped trajectory depicts pairs (V  ;V +) such that Ev is constant
but where v increases (as V + grows). We use these two parameter trajectories to generate the
remaining ￿gures of the paper.
The spread of the distribution of consumer valuations v determines the scope for di￿erentiation
in the marketplace. This in turn determines the intensity of competition, because it a￿ects the
ability of ￿rms to compete when setting di￿erent levels of disclosure. 12 Figure 3 depicts the
impact of variations in the spread. When the spread is small, so that consumer valuations are
almost homogeneous, both ￿rms engage in a similar level of disclosure. This results in intense
price competition and low pro￿ts, driving both ￿rms to heavily subsidize consumers by quoting
11For completeness, we have also evaluated unilateral ￿rm deviations to uncovered market con￿gurations. The
shaded region in the right panel in Figure 2 identi￿es parameter values where the solution derived in Proposition 2
does not constitute an equilibrium of the game in which ￿rms may choose not to cover the market. The analysis of
uncovered market deviations is included in Appendix B.
12Although our analysis is restricted to the case of duopoly, we expect the implications of consumer heterogeneity
to apply more generally. Note that a lower valuation spread reduces the valuation di￿erential between the consumers
served by each ￿rm. This drives ￿rms to reduce their e￿ective di￿erentiation, or the di￿erence in their levels of
disclosure, in order to attract consumers. The same mechanism would be present with the entry of additional ￿rms
in the market.
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Figure 3: Duopoly disclosures (left) and prices (right) as a function of the consumer population’s
valuation spread.
negative prices. As the valuation spread converges to zero, V +   V   ! 0, the disclosure of both
￿rms converges to the monopoly solution and ￿rm pro￿ts converge to zero. When the spread
increases so that consumers become more heterogeneous in their valuations, one ￿rm chooses to
increase its disclosure above that of the monopoly solution and the other ￿rm reduces its disclosure
below it, so that the e￿ective di￿erentiation of both ￿rms increases. This softens price competition
and allows ￿rms to increase prices, thus increasing pro￿ts.
The impact of an increase in the valuation mean Ev is depicted in Figure 4. This increases
the average willingness to pay of consumers and therefore increases potential price revenues for
￿rms, which reduces the comparative attractiveness of disclosure revenues and drives them to
reduce disclosure levels. When both ￿rms are actively engaged in disclosure (Region A) they can
do so increasing their di￿erentiation, which allows them to increase their price and their pro￿ts.
When consumer valuations are su￿ciently high (Region B), the low-disclosure ￿rm chooses not
to engage in disclosure and focuses exclusively on price revenues. This is the only instance of
positive prices that arises in equilibrium (with the exception of a small neighboring range of the
parameter space). E￿ective di￿erentiation is reduced as the high-disclosure ￿rm further reduces
its level of disclosure. When consumer valuations increase further (Region C), neither ￿rm engages
in disclosure and competitive pressure drives prices and pro￿ts down to zero. We further discuss
this outcome where di￿erentiation breaks down in Section 5.1.
Having characterized the duopoly solution, our next proposition establishes the qualitative
impact of competition in the marketplace.
Proposition 3. Comparison of the duopoly and monopoly solutions reveals that competition has
two main e￿ects on the marketplace: the introduction of a low-disclosure (high-quality) service
when consumers exhibit low valuations V   < 1, given by dl < dh  dm, and subsidization of the
high-disclosure (low-quality) service, ph  0 < pm.
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Figure 4: Duopoly disclosures (left) and prices (right) as a function of the consumer population’s
valuation mean.
The ￿rst part of the proposition follows from the fact that the monopolist chooses to engage in
disclosure when low valuation consumers are present in the market, V   < 1. The high-disclosure
duopolist sets a level of disclosure which is approximately equivalent to that of the monopolist
though marginally higher. The low-disclosure duopolist, however, sets a disclosure level which is
qualitatively di￿erent from that of the monopolist. This can be veri￿ed by inspection of monopoly
disclosure dm in Figure 1 and duopoly disclosures dl and dh in Figures 3 and 4 (disclosures are
plotted over the same range in the three ￿gures). Note that when V   > 1, neither the monopolist
nor the low-disclosure duopolist engage in disclosure. Therefore, whenever low valuation consumers
are present in the market, our model predicts that low-disclosure services which are sustained
exclusively by price revenues only arise under competition.
Regarding the second part of the proposition, note that the monopolist quotes a positive
price but the duopolist supplying the high-disclosure service quotes a negative price to subsidize
consumers (Regions A and B) or zero price when not engaging in disclosure (Region C). Clearly,
the di￿erence in pricing is due to the competitive pressure faced by the duopolist, as in both
cases consumers exhibit positive willingness to pay for the service. It can be shown that the price
di￿erential under both regimes, pm  ph, decreases with the valuation spread v which determines
the intensity of competition. Thus our model predicts that consumer subsidization in the presence
of disclosure revenues is a direct consequence of competition.
It should be clear that both of the above e￿ects of competition bene￿t consumers, allowing them
to select into lower disclosure alternatives and subsidizing them under higher levels of disclosure.
The ￿rst e￿ect bene￿ts high-valuation consumers the most, and the second e￿ect bene￿ts mainly
low-valuation consumers. Both e￿ects also contribute to explain the relative pro￿tability obtained
by each duopolist. In the next section we disentangle in more detail the impact of competition on
￿rm pro￿ts and consumer surplus.
185 Discussion
In this section we examine the managerial, policy, and empirical implications of our results. In
order to proceed it is useful to formalize additional notation ￿rst. We will denote the market share
of ￿rm j by sj. The market share of ￿rm j when serving consumers vi 2 [v
 
j ;v
+
j ] in a covered
market can be written as
sj =
v
+
j   v
 
j
V +   V  :
We de￿ne the information stock of ￿rm j, denoted by Yj, as the total stock of consumer
information accumulated by the ￿rm in the marketplace. Given that the market is covered in
equilibrium and information provision is homogenous across consumers signing up for each service,
the information stock derived by ￿rm j is given by
Yj = sj yj:
The information disclosed by ￿rm j, denoted by Y d
j , is then given by Y d
j = dj Yj.
We can write the surplus enjoyed in equilibrium by consumers signed up with ￿rm j as
CSj =
1
V +   V  
 v+
j
v 
j
ui;j dvi
We start by reviewing the managerial implications of our results.
5.1 Managerial implications
The pro￿ts of ￿rms competing with privacy are asymmetric in our model. Pro￿ts vary with the
valuations of the consumer population, and neither duopolist consistently outperforms the other
one. Inspection of the duopoly solution yields the following result.
Proposition 4. Duopoly pro￿ts are increasing in the consumer valuation spread (decreasing in
the intensity of competition) and non-monotonic with respect to the consumer valuation mean
(willingness to pay). The high-disclosure ￿rm derives higher pro￿ts and market share when the
valuation mean is low (l < h and sl < sh in Regions A and B1), the low-disclosure ￿rm derives
higher pro￿ts and market share when the valuation mean is high ( l > h and sl > sh in Region
B2), and both ￿rms are engaged in Bertrand competition and derive zero pro￿ts when the valuation
mean is very high (l = h = 0 in Region C).
The pro￿ts of both duopolists increase with the consumer valuation spread, given that a higher
spread increases the scope for di￿erentiation (see our discussion above in Section 4 as well as
Figure 3). The mean valuation of the consumer population, which captures the willingness to pay,
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Figure 5: Duopoly pro￿ts (left) and market shares (right) as a function of the consumer popula-
tion’s valuation mean.
exhibits a more complex impact on pro￿ts and determines the pro￿t ranking of both ￿rms. When
the mean valuation is low (Regions A and B1 in Figure 2), the high-disclosure ￿rm derives higher
pro￿ts in the marketplace. It achieves this by engaging in a high level of disclosure and heavily
subsidizing consumers. Conversely, when the mean is high (Region B2), the low-disclosure ￿rm
outperforms the high-disclosure ￿rm by quoting positive prices and not engaging in disclosure.
When mean valuation is very high (Region C), neither ￿rm engages in disclosure and both derive
zero pro￿ts. Figure 5 plots the pro￿ts and market shares of both ￿rms to illustrate the argument.
The result is driven by the fact that disclosure prices are ￿xed (and exogenous) in our model,
so the relative pro￿tability of disclosure for ￿rms depends on consumer valuations. When con-
sumers exhibit low willingness to pay for the service, disclosure revenues are comparatively high,
so the high-disclosure ￿rm can o￿er subsidies to attract low-valuation consumers away from the
competitor while remaining pro￿table. When consumers’ willingness to pay for the service is
high, however, disclosure revenues are low in comparison and attracting consumers to the high-
disclosure service is less pro￿table. The low-disclosure ￿rm becomes comparatively more attractive
for consumers and can sustain positive prices. When the willingness to pay is very high, such that
consumer valuations are high and mostly homogenous, disclosure revenues are insu￿cient for the
high-disclosure ￿rm to pro￿tably attract consumers given that the subsidies required to do so
would result in negative pro￿ts. Di￿erentiation therefore cannot pay o￿, and both ￿rms wind up
supplying zero-disclosure services and face intense price competition. The result shows that an
increase in consumers’ willingness to pay, which would always bene￿t a monopolist, can render
￿rms worse o￿ under competition.
Another property of our model is that the pro￿t ranking of ￿rms corresponds with their market
share ranking. As shown in Figure 5, the most pro￿table ￿rm also commands a larger market share
in the duopoly equilibrium. This implies that ￿rms maximize pro￿ts at the extensive rather than
20the intensive margin, outperforming competitors by attracting a larger customer base rather than
by extracting higher revenues from a smaller base. This holds for the ￿rm exploiting disclosure
revenues when consumer willingness to pay is low as well as for the ￿rm exploiting price revenues
when it is high. Although the result hinges on our assumption that consumer valuations are
uniformly distributed, it suggests that market shares can be a good predictor of pro￿tability even
when ￿rms exploit disclosure revenues (i.e., ￿rms do not sacri￿ce pro￿ts for market share)
An immediate takeaway of our analysis is that lower disclosure (higher quality) does not imply
higher pro￿ts in the marketplace. In fact, when the willingness to pay of the consumer population
is low, the contrary is true. This outcome di￿ers from that of a standard vertical di￿erentiation
model, where the highest quality ￿rm is always the most pro￿table (and which corresponds to
the low-disclosure ￿rm in our model, which has the highest informational quality for consumers).
Another point of divergence is that di￿erentiation can break down in our model, with ￿rms engaging
in Bertrand competition when consumer valuations are very high. Both divergences are due to the
presence of an additional revenue stream which is inversely related to quality, and which intensi￿es
competition in our model by enabling ￿rms to subsidize consumers. 13
5.2 Policy implications
We next examine in more detail the implications of competition on the information stocks accumu-
lated and disclosed by ￿rms. This provides a useful metric of consumer privacy in the marketplace
and determines (together with prices) the surplus derived by consumers. Inspection of Yj, Y d
j and
CSj provides the following result.
Proposition 5. Under duopoly, the stock of consumer information obtained by each ￿rm is equiva-
lent when they both engage in disclosure, and the low-disclosure ￿rm’s stock is larger when it chooses
not to engage in disclosure (Yh  Yl with strict inequality if dl = 0). Total consumer information
disclosed is decreasing in consumer valuation mean (willingness to pay) and non-monotonic with
respect to consumer valuation spread (intensity of competition). Comparison of the duopoly and
monopoly solutions reveals that competition generally lowers information disclosed and increases
consumer surplus (Y d
h + Y d
l  Y d
m except for a subset of Region B2, and CSh + CSl > CSm).
To understand the result, consider ￿rst the determinants of the information stock accumulated
by ￿rms in the marketplace. The information stock obtained by each ￿rm is a function of both
13See Wauthy (1996) for a detailed characterization of equilibrium market con￿gurations and pro￿ts in the
standard vertical di￿erentiation model. We note that the Bertrand outcome in our model is similar to the preempted
market con￿guration identi￿ed by Wauthy where the high-quality ￿rm prices the low-quality ￿rm out of the market.
In our model, the high-quality ￿rm cannot preempt the market by quoting a positive price because the low-quality
￿rm can sustain negative prices with disclosure revenues. Competition is therefore more intense and the preempted
market con￿guration arises only (under consumer indi￿erence between both ￿rms) when the high-quality ￿rm lowers
its price down to zero, e￿ectively driving both ￿rms to Bertrand competition. Also note that the market is never
preempted by the low-quality ￿rm in Wauthy’s analysis nor in our model, despite the presence of disclosure revenues.
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Figure 6: Information disclosed (left) and consumer surplus generated by each ￿rm (right) as a
function of the consumer population’s valuation spread.
its user base and its level of disclosure ￿ on how many consumers provide it with information
and how much information each consumer provides. Under duopoly, when both ￿rms engage in
disclosure, they obtain the same information stock in equilibrium because asymmetries in their
user bases and disclosure levels even out (Region A). When the low-disclosure ￿rm does not engage
in disclosure, it obtains a larger information stock than the competitor (Regions B and C, under
consumer indi￿erence in the latter).
The total information stock obtained by ￿rms is generally larger under duopoly than under
monopoly. When consumers with low valuations are present ( V   < 1) so that disclosure-intensive
services are supplied under both market con￿gurations, duopolists generally obtain a higher infor-
mation stock. This follows from the fact that their average disclosure level is lower than that of the
monopolist and consumer information provision is linear in disclosure. When no consumers with
low valuations are present (V   > 1) so that zero-disclosure services are supplied, the information
stock accumulated by duopolists coincides with that of the monopolist. The exception to the above
is the region neighboring V   = 1 where duopoly disclosures are marginally higher than that of
the monopolist (the subset of Region B2 where V   > 1, given that dm = 0 < dh). Therefore,
if the policy maker’s goal were to maximize the information stock accumulated by ￿rms in the
marketplace, our model suggests that e￿ective competition is the best way to achieve it.
Consider next the e￿ective stock of information disclosed by ￿rms, as depicted in Figure 6.
The total stock of information disclosed in the marketplace is generally lower under duopoly than
under monopoly (with the exception of the subset of Region B2 noted above). Competition drives
￿rms to accumulate a larger information stock and disclose a smaller part of it. Moreover, a high
level of disclosure under competition need not result in a high volume of information disclosed,
because consumers account for it when selecting which service to patronize. It can be shown that
the e￿ective stock of information disclosed by the high-disclosure ￿rm in equilibrium Y d
h varies
22only marginally with its disclosure level dh.
An important result of our model is that higher competition intensity need not improve con-
sumer privacy in the marketplace. Or more precisely, a reduction in the spread of consumers’
valuation distribution, which intensi￿es competition, can increase information disclosed Y d
h + Y d
l
rather than decrease it. The intuition for this result lies in the fact that ￿rms can translate com-
petitive pressure both to prices and to disclosure levels, so competition can discipline the former
rather than the latter. Consider the impact of a reduction in the valuation spread that intensi-
￿es competition. When consumer valuations are low (Regions A and B1) ￿rms tend to reduce
prices and increase disclosure levels, driving up Y d
h + Y d
l . When consumer valuations are high
(Region B2), ￿rms tend to raise prices and reduce disclosure levels instead, driving down Y d
h +Y d
l .
Intuitively, ￿rms prefer to sacri￿ce the revenue source that is less pro￿table and can do so by com-
pensating consumers through the other source (through lower prices, or through lower disclosure).
Therefore, high volumes of disclosed information should be expected in a competitive marketplace
when consumers’ willingness to pay for services is low relative to the disclosure revenues available
to ￿rms.14
It is also interesting to evaluate the ranking of both duopolists in generating consumer surplus,
which is also depicted in Figure 6. The high-disclosure duopolist generates higher consumer surplus
in the market when it engages in high levels of disclosure (Region A and a neighboring subset of
Region B). Recall that this duopolist sets a higher disclosure level than that of the monopolist in
this range, dh > dm. The low-disclosure duopolist becomes the largest contributor to consumer
surplus when it chooses not to engage in disclosure (most of Region B). The result underscores
the fact that informed rational consumers can bene￿t both from services intensive in disclosure
as well as from services that are not, and neither commands superior welfare properties in the
marketplace.
5.3 Empirical implications
In this section we identify qualitative predictions that can be drawn from our results and tested
with market data in future empirical research. We start by summarizing the properties of duopoly
equilibria in our model. The following table identi￿es equilibrium predictions as a function of
consumer valuations for the service.
14To evaluate the robustness of this result we have also analyzed the case where ￿rms are horizontally di￿erenti-
ated, solving a Hotelling variant of our model where consumer utility is given by ui;j = v yi;j(1 yi;j dj) tdi;j pj
(the analysis is available from the authors on request). In this model, consumers are homogeneous in their valuation
v but di￿er in their distance di;j to ￿rms, exhibiting an idiosyncratic preference for one of them. The intensity
of competition is captured by transport cost parameter t. In a covered market equilibrium, it can be shown that
￿rms set the monopoly disclosure level characterized in Proposition 1, so higher intensity of competition (lower
transport cost t) does not improve consumer privacy. This con￿rms that our result is not an artifact of our focus
on vertical di￿erentiation, and suggests that consumer preferences play an important role in shaping the interplay
of competition and privacy.
23Low spread v High spread v
High mean Ev (Region C)
ph = pl = 0
dl = dh = 0
l = h = 0
sl + sh = 1
Yl =
sl
2 ; Yh =
sh
2
(Region B2)
ph < 0 < pl
dl = 0 < dh
l > h
sl > sh
Yl > Yh
Low mean Ev (Region A)
ph < pl < 0
0 < dl < dh
l < h
sl < sh
Yl = Yh
(Region B1)
ph < 0 < pl
dl = 0 < dh
l < h
sl < sh
Yl > Yh
Firm pro￿ts are higher in the quadrants to the right where there is a high spread, as discussed
in Section 5.1. To illustrate the properties of these quadrants it is useful to return to the Microsoft
and Amazon examples we outlined in the introduction. Microsoft’s O￿ce 365 service matches
the strategy of ￿rm l in the top-right quadrant, and Amazon’s Special O￿ers program matches
that of ￿rm h in the bottom-left quadrant. Microsoft competes with Google in the market for
o￿ce software applications by committing to a no-disclosure policy and setting comparatively
high prices for its O￿ce 365 service. Amazon competes with Google in the market for retail
search intermediation by engaging in a higher level of disclosure with third-party sellers and setting
comparatively higher consumer subsidies with its Special O￿ers program. Google in turn competes
by exploiting disclosure revenues in both markets. We expect average willingness to pay Ev and
consumer heterogeneity v to be higher in the market for o￿ce software than in that for retail
search intermediation, among other factors because it is heavily participated by businesses in
addition to consumers. Our analysis would then suggest that both Microsoft and Amazon are
deploying successful business models to compete with Google in these markets.
Based on our preceding analysis and the equilibrium properties listed in the table, we next
outline three main empirical predictions generated by our model.
Empirical prediction 1. (Business models) Firms enjoying signi￿cant market power exploit both
price and disclosure revenues, and ￿rms under competitive pressure exploit a single revenue source.
Proposition 1 shows that the monopolist exploits both disclosure and price revenues simulta-
neously, and Proposition 2 shows that ￿rms under competitive pressure tend to exploit a single
revenue source (see also Proposition 3 and our related discussion). This prediction implies that
Microsoft and Amazon, which are under competitive pressure from Google in the markets identi-
￿ed in our examples, should exploit a single revenue source.
Empirical prediction 2. (Pro￿tability) When the average willingness to pay is low (high) relative
to potential disclosure revenues in a competitive marketplace, the high-disclosure (low-disclosure)
￿rm realizes higher pro￿ts.
24Proposition 4 shows that the relative performance of ￿rms competing with privacy depends on
the valuation mean of the consumer population. When consumers’ willingness to pay is low relative
to the revenues ￿rms can generate by disclosing their information, ￿rms exploiting disclosure
revenues derive higher pro￿ts. The contrary is true when the willingness to pay of consumers is
relatively high. This prediction implies that Microsoft and Amazon should be more pro￿table
than Google in the markets identi￿ed in our examples. We also note that market shares and pro￿t
rankings are positively correlated in our model, so we should expect Microsoft and Amazon to also
derive larger market shares.
Empirical prediction 3. (Information) In a competitive marketplace, the low-disclosure ￿rm
only obtains a larger stock of consumer information than the high-disclosure ￿rm when setting a
no-disclosure policy.
Proposition 5 shows that the information stocks accumulated by both duopolists coincide when
they both engage in a positive level of disclosure. When the low-disclosure ￿rm chooses not to
engage in disclosure, however, it obtains a larger information stock than the competitor. Therefore,
Amazon and Google should accumulate an equivalent information stock from consumers in the
market for retail search intermediation, given that they both engage in disclosure. In the market
for o￿ce software applications, however, Microsoft should accumulate a larger information stock
of documents than Google Docs because it provides a no-disclosure service while Google does not.
6 Concluding remarks
At the outset of this paper we set out to address some questions which can now be answered. First,
how does privacy a￿ect competition? Our analysis suggests that privacy can soften the intensity of
competition when consumers (a) are heterogeneous so that ￿rms can e￿ectively di￿erentiate in their
privacy policies, and (b) their willingness to pay is not exceedingly high so that ￿rms disclosing
their information can operate pro￿tably. Second, should ￿rms exploit all available revenue sources,
prices and disclosure, or focus on one? Firms under competitive pressure should focus on a single
revenue source. Firms may exploit disclosure revenues and subsidize consumers in order to attract
them to their service, or choose not to engage in disclosure and quote positive prices instead. Third,
which strategy is more pro￿table and what does it depend on? When consumers’ willingness to pay
is low relative to the revenues generated by disclosing their information, ￿rms focused on disclosure
revenues will outperform their competitors. And conversely, ￿rms focused on price revenues will
perform better when the relative willingness to pay of consumers is high. In both cases, ￿rms
maximize pro￿ts at the extensive rather than the intensive margin, outperforming competitors by
attracting a larger customer base to their service.
In concluding our analysis, it is important to stress that we provide a benchmark for informed
and rational consumers. We expect increasing consumer awareness of disclosure practices and
25familiarity with its implications to reinforce its relevance. Recent surveys of consumer attitudes
towards privacy underscore this trend. Alan Westin, a pioneering scholar in the ￿eld of privacy,
noted in 2008 that ￿o￿ering online users free email or free searches did not seem to a majority of our
respondents to be a su￿cient set of bene￿ts or valued services to overcome the instinctive feeling of
not wanting to be tracked and marketed to based on their online transactions and surfs.￿ 15 We also
expect transparency to play an important role in informing consumer decisions and delivering a
competitive supply of services. Initiatives to make disclosure practices salient and understandable
for consumers are clearly desirable from a policy perspective. But our results recommend caution
on restricting disclosure practices. We have shown that high-disclosure services play an important
role in a competitive marketplace and informed consumers adjust their choices accordingly.
Finally, our framework also provides a context to understand innovation in the provision of
information-intensive services. Social networking, for instance, can be understood as a service
innovation that generates utility for users willing to post information that would otherwise re-
main private. In the mobile app ecosystem, new services are ￿ourishing that help consumers store
and process snippets of their personal information. Firms supplying these innovative services are
accumulating consumer information, and such information stocks generate new disclosure oppor-
tunities. Consumer data brokers are aggregating information from increasingly diverse sources,
enabling these services to monetize consumer information snippets by contributing to broader
pro￿ling. And new instances of such services will continue to emerge with future advances in
information technologies. These underlying technology drivers suggest that consumer privacy will
continue to shape competition for the foreseeable future.
15See Alan Westin’s report ‘How online users feel about behavioral marketing and how adoption of privacy and
security policies could a￿ect their feelings,’ Privacy Consulting Group, March 2008.
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Proof of Proposition 2. We solve the game by backwards induction. As discussed in Section 4,
the equilibrium information provision of consumers patronizing ￿rm j 2 fl;hg in the fourth stage
is given by yj =
1 dj
2 . To characterize consumer purchases in the third stage when dl < dh and
ph < pl, let vp (pl;ph;dl;dh) =
4(pl ph)
(dh dl)(2 dh dl) be the valuation of the consumer indi￿erent between
purchasing from ￿rm l and ￿rm h. Consumers with vi 2 [V  ;vf) stay out of the market, where
vf =
4ph
(1 dh)2 is the valuation of the consumer indi￿erent between signing up and staying out of
the market. Consumers with vi 2 [vf;vp) sign up with ￿rm h and consumers with vi 2 [vp;V +]
sign up with ￿rm l. Note that a covered market con￿guration requires vf  V  . We proceed
to characterize equilibrium prices and disclosures assuming the market is covered and later verify
that the solution indeed satis￿es vf  V  .
To solve for the equilibrium choices of both ￿rms, note that pro￿t functions in a covered market
are as follows: l(pl;ph;dl;dh) =
V + vp
V + V  (pl + dl yl) and h(pl;ph;dl;dh) =
vp V  
V + V  (ph + dh yh). To
solve for prices in the second stage, we can easily derive the price best-response functions and solve
for the equilibrium to obtain:
pl (dl;dh) =
 
d
2
h(2 + V
    2V
+)   2dh(1 + V
    2V
+) + dl
 
dl(4   V
  + 2V
+)   4 + 2V
    4V
+
=12
ph (dl;dh) =
 
d
2
l(2   2V
  + V
+) + dl( 2 + 4V
    2V
+) + dh
 
dh(4 + 2V
    V
+)   4   4V
  + 2V
+
=12:
It is immediate to verify that the second-order conditions are satis￿ed at these prices.
In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms choose disclosure levels dl and dh. We substitute pl (dl;dh) and ph (dl;dh)
in l(pl;ph;dl;dh) and h(pl;ph;dl;dh) to obtain pro￿ts as functions of dl and dh alone. Solving
@j(dj;d j)=@dj = 0 for each ￿rm identi￿es three candidate best-responses per ￿rm. Denote the
candidate best-responses of ￿rm j by ^ dk
j and let superscript k 2 fa;b;cg identify each of the three
solutions, then
^ d
a
l =2   dh  
2
V     2V + + 2
^ d
b
l =
3   dh
2
+
p
(2V +   V     2)(1   dh)(2((1   V +)dh + V +   5)   V   (1   dh))
4V +   2V     4
^ d
c
l =
3   dh
2
 
p
(2V +   V     2)(1   dh)(2((1   V +)dh + V +   5)   V   (1   dh))
4V +   2V     4
^ d
a
h =2   dl  
2
V +   2V   + 2
^ d
b
h =
3   dl
2
+
p
(V +   2V   + 2)(1   dl)(V +   2V   (1   dl)   (2 + V +)dl + 10)
2V +   4V   + 4
^ d
c
h =
3   dl
2
 
p
(V +   2V   + 2)(1   dl)(V +   2v (1   dl)   (2 + V +)dl + 10)
2V +   4V   + 4
:
To identify valid best-responses, note that ^ dk
l is only a best-response for ￿rm l when it satis￿es
27the second-order condition @2l(^ dk
l ;dh)=@d2
l < 0, given the disclosure ordering ^ dk
l  dh taking dh
as exogenous. This identi￿es a parameter space over V  , V +, and dh for each valid best-response
of ￿rm l, and allows us to discard ^ dc
l which is never a valid best-response. The same process can
be repeated to identify the valid best-responses of ￿rm h, where the disclosure ordering is given
by dl  ^ dk
h taking dl as exogenous. This allows us to discard ^ da
h. The valid best-responses of both
￿rms are given by
^ d
a
l is a valid best-response when V   < 2V +   2 and 1+V   2V +
2+V   2V + < dh
^ d
b
l is a valid best-response when V   > 2V +   2and (1+V   2V +
2+V   2V + < dh < 1 or dh > 10+V   2V +
2+V   2V + )
^ d
b
h is a valid best-response when dl < 1
^ d
c
h is a valid best-response when dl < 1 2V  +V +
2 2V  +V +:
We next identify candidate equilibria by solving for dl and dh based on each combination of
valid best-responses for ￿rm l and ￿rm h, and evaluate whether the solution is contained in the
parameter space where both best-responses hold. It can be readily veri￿ed that the single candidate
equilibrium in the game is given by ^ db
l and ^ dc
h. Also note that @ ^ db
l=@dh > 0 and @ ^ dc
h=@dl > 0, so
￿rm disclosures are strategic complements. Firm disclosures in the candidate equilibrium are
characterized by
d
bc
l =1 +
2
3
 
1
V +   V    
s
V +   2V   + 2
(2 + V     2V +)(V +   V  )2
!
d
bc
h =1  
2
3
 
1
V +   V    
s
2V +   V     2
(2V     2   V +)(V +   V  )2
!
within the parameter space
V
  > 2V
+   2:
For the candidate equilibrium to hold, ￿rm disclosures must be contained within the valid
disclosure range, dj 2 [0;1]. Corner solutions need to be considered when valid best-responses
fall outside the valid disclosure range. Inspection of dbc
l and dbc
h reveals that ￿rm disclosures in
the candidate equilibrium can adopt negative values. The parameter space for interior and corner
solutions can be identi￿ed by determining the range where ￿rm l’s best-response binds dbc
l  0
and evaluating whether the best-response of ￿rm h given by ^ dc
h(dl = 0) also binds or not. This
identi￿es the following regions within the solution space,
0 < d
bc
l < d
bc
h < 1 when V   > V  and V + < 1
d
bc
l = 0 < d
bc
h < 1 when (V    V  and V + < 1) or (V   < V  and V +  1)
d
bc
l = d
bc
h = 0 when V    V  and V + > 1
28where
V
 =
1
6

9V
+   2  
p
52   60V + + 9(V +)2

V
 =
1 + V +
2
:
The interior and corner solutions identi￿ed above must yield a covered market in order to
constitute an equilibrium. Inspection of the indi￿erent consumer vf(ph;dh) across the interior and
corner solutions reveals that vf  V   is always the case, so the market is e￿ectively covered.
Appendix B
This appendix examines whether the solution characterized in Proposition 2 constitutes an equi-
librium of the game in which ￿rms may choose not to cover the market. We proceed by evaluating
unilateral deviations to uncovered market con￿gurations by each ￿rm, and show that such devia-
tions only pay o￿ for ￿rm h in a small region of the solution space. This region is depicted in the
right panel of Figure 2.
A unilateral deviation by ￿rm j to an uncovered market con￿guration consists of a disclosure-
price pair du
j and pu
j which satis￿es vf > V   (ensures that low-valuation consumers prefer not
to purchase) taking the other ￿rm’s strategy as ￿xed and given by d j and p j characterized in
Proposition 2. Recall that consumers with higher valuation vi  vf always prefer to participate
in the market given that @ui;j=@vi > 0, so an uncovered market con￿guration implies that low
valuation consumers choose not to participate. We consider unilateral deviations by ￿rms in the
￿rst and second stages of the game that satisfy dl  dh and pl  ph, and evaluate their impact on
consumer demand and information provision yu
j in the third and fourth stages.
We need only consider deviations by ￿rm h. Note that deviations by ￿rm l cannot yield an
uncovered market given that ￿rm h’s equilibrium strategy in Proposition 2 ensures that vf  V  ,
so no unilateral deviation by ￿rm l can yield an uncovered market. A unilateral deviation by
￿rm h that yields an uncovered market can result in three di￿erent market con￿gurations. If
V   < vf < vp < V + after the deviation, both ￿rms continue to derive positive demand. If
V   < vf < V +  vp, ￿rm h takes over the market and serves all participating consumers. If
vf  vp, ￿rm h derives no demand after the deviation. We can dismiss the last case because such
a deviation will never payo￿ for ￿rm h:
Consider ￿rst the case of deviations where both ￿rms derive positive demand. The deviation
pro￿ts of ￿rm h, to be denoted by u
h, can then be written as

u
h(pl;p
u
h;dl;d
u
h) =
vp   vf
V +   V  (p
u
h + d
u
h y
u
h)
where the pivot consumer vp is given by (8), the indi￿erent consumer vf by (3), and consumer
information provision for the deviating ￿rm yu
h by (2), accounting for ￿rm h’s deviation disclosure
29du
h and price pu
h. In order to identify the most pro￿table deviation we next solve for the optimal
deviation price of ￿rm h,
p
u
h =
(1   du
h)(2(1   dh)pl   dh(1   dl)2)
4(1   dl) 2 : (10)
We next argue that it is optimal for ￿rm h to take over the market and serve all participating
consumers when deviating to an uncovered market con￿guration. Plugging dl and pl from Propo-
sition 2 and optimal deviation price pu
h in (10) into the pivot consumer vp in (8) as well as the
indi￿erent consumer vf in (3), it can be shown that vp(pl;pu
h;dl;du
h)   vf(pu
h;du
h) > V +   V   for
all du
h 2 [dl;1] across the solution space characterized in Proposition 2. This implies that it is
always optimal for ￿rm h to take over the market when deviating, because the optimal price in
an uncovered market con￿guration where vf > V   ensures that vp > V + so that all participating
consumers purchase from ￿rm h.
The deviation pro￿ts of ￿rm h in an uncovered takeover con￿guration (where it takes over the
market) are given by

u;t
h (pl;p
u
h;dl;d
u
h) =
V +   vf
V +   V  (p
u
h + d
u
hy
u
h):
The optimal deviation price of ￿rm h is then the highest price that ensures that all participating
consumers sign up to its service. The pivot consumer must then be given by vp = V +. Denote
this deviation price by p
u;t
h . Equating ui;l(pl;dl) = ui;h(p
u;t
h ;du
h) for consumer vi = V + and solving
for p
u;t
h yields
p
u;t
h =
1
4
(4pl   V
+(d
u
h   dl)(2   d
u
h   dl): (11)
Closed-form solutions for optimal deviation disclosure du
h cannot be derived, unfortunately.
We proceed by determining the disclosure range for du
h to yield an uncovered market given op-
timal deviation price p
u;t
h . Denote the upper boundary of this disclosure range by d
u
h. Solving
for vf(p
u;t
h ;du
h) = V   obtains two candidate solutions. It can be shown by plugging dl and pl
from Proposition 2 (for the interior and corner cases) into both candidate solutions that only the
following one is well de￿ned within the feasible disclosure range dh 2 [0;1],
d
u
h =
V +   V   +
p
(V +   V  )(V + (1   dl) 2   4pl)
V +   V   : (12)
We have established that a unilateral deviation by ￿rm h to an uncovered market con￿guration
can only be pro￿table in the disclosure range du
h < d
u
h and entails ￿rm h setting price p
u;t
h to take
over the market. Outside this disclosure range, the optimal pricing strategy of ￿rm h implies
covering the market, and therefore cannot yield higher pro￿ts than those derived in the solution
characterized in Proposition 2. Given that a closed-form solution is not available, we use numerical
analysis to identify pro￿table deviations. We identify parameter pairs (V  ;V +) within the solution
space of Proposition 2 where deviations by ￿rm h to price p
u;t
h in (11) and disclosure in the range
30du
h 2 [dl;d
u
h) where d
u
h is given by (12) yield a higher pro￿t than that derived in the covered market
equilibrium, 
u;t
h > h. The region where uncovered market deviations pay o￿ for ￿rm h is depicted
in the right panel of Figure 2, and the code used to perform the numerical analysis is available
from the authors on request.
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